Settlement
An optional TON-based economic layer (design). Only PAID jobs touch chain; free jobs run fully off-chain and never reach any contract. The figures below are REAL outputs from this run's paid jobs — the settlement doubles opened, settled, and anchored them on-chain.
The optional 'who gets paid' layer. The requester escrows a maximum price up front; the winning worker is paid from it, each agreeing helper gets a small fixed cut, and the unused remainder is refunded.
Impact: Honest, fast work earns more and provably bad work loses staked money — so the economics push everyone toward correct results. Free public jobs skip all of this and never touch a blockchain.
- platform fee φ
- 15%
- verifier commission κ
- 5%
- verification surcharge
- 5%
φ is taken once on the escrow; κ is a flat cut paid to each agreeing non-winner that helped form the quorum. The winner takes the bounded remainder.
- formula
- rate × seconds
- cap multiplier
- 5×
- metering tolerance
- 1.5×
Cost = per-second rate × processing seconds. The 5× cap is both the billing ceiling and a hard execution deadline; the escrow is sized to the worst case (an up-front coverage check), and the unused remainder is refunded.
- w_stake
- 0.30
- reliability floor
- 0.50
The stake ranking term is reliability-gated: it only amplifies hosts whose verified-success rate already clears the floor, so extra stake can never rescue an unreliable node or buy its way to the top.
Contracts
sharded · no global contract- deposit + unbond with cooldown
- graduated slashing + split
- keeper-triggered withdraw
- also the receipt-jetton master
- minted 1:1 against bond
- transfer-LOCKED while bonded
- anti-exit / anti-wash proof
- burned on full unbond
- one contract instance per paid job
- HTLC-style release on quorum result hash
- refund-on-timeout to requester
- no funds pooled globally
- one root per epoch, chained to parent
- stake-weighted acceptance
- permissionless keeper submission
- bonded dispute → verdict
Off-chain split
- fee =
- φ · B
- commission_j =
- κ · B (to each agreeing verifier)
- winner =
- B − φ·B − κ·B·participants
- total =
- fee + Σ commission + winner = B
Inputs
B = 100 TONBreakdown
bars scaled to escrow BThis run settled
From a real escrow of 100 TON: winner 76.92 TON, fee 11.54 TON, commission 3.85 TON to each of 3 verifiers, totalling 100.00 TON.
On-chain design params
These govern the on-chain JobEscrow perf-split (a quality- and speed-weighted bonus). Off-chain, the winner simply takes the escrow remainder — the bonus is bounded by B, so no payout can ever exceed the escrowed maximum.
| Node | Wallet | Stake | stake_factor | Public | Internal | Sensitive |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| frost-owl | 4,200 TON | 0.72 | ok | ok | ok | |
| harbor-vole | 3,000 TON | 0.70 | ok | ok | ok | |
| tidal-fox | 2,600 TON | 0.68 | ok | ok | ok | |
| marsh-otter | 3,400 TON | 0.71 | ok | ok | ok | |
| amber-mole | 1,500 TON | 0.64 | ok | ok | ok | |
| pine-marten | 1,200 TON | 0.62 | ok | ok | ok | |
| slate-heron | 120 TON | 0.42 | ok | ok | — |
| Condition | Severity | Bond slashed |
|---|---|---|
| wrong_result | high | 15% |
| provable_cheat | max | 100% |
| equivocation | high | 50% |
| failed_commitment | medium | 10% |
| downtime | low | 2% |
Fractions sum to 1.0 — the entire slashed amount is distributed, never retained by any single party.
Events
real escrow lifecycle| Type | Job | TON |
|---|---|---|
| Opened | 100 | |
| Settled | 100 | |
| Opened | 100 | |
| Settled | 100 | |
| Opened | 100 | |
| Settled | 100 |
Payout split
first settled jobA BLAKE3 Merkle path of 2 sibling hashes reconstructs the anchored root from this leaf — proving the receipt was included without revealing the rest of the tree.